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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 981375-CA

WILLIAM J. CHEVRE,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant,
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of guilty to one
count of possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), a
third degree felony.

This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court properly determine that the police

officer, who was following defendant down a hill and who observed
a malfunctioning brake light on defendant's tractor trailer, had
reasonable suspicion to stop defendant?
xx

[W]hether a specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable

suspicion is a determination of law and is reviewable
nondeferentially for correctness!.]"

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d

932, 939 (Utah 1994) . This standard, however, ''conveys a measure
of discretion to the trial judge," falling short of a de novo

review.
2.

Id.
Did the trial court properly determine that the scope of

the stop was justified beyond its original purpose where the
officer observed that the driver of the tractor trailer was so
nervous that his foot clattered noticeably against the brake
pedal, he was unable to coherently answer even simple questions,
and he exhibited a significant physical disability?
3.

Was the officer's search of the sleeper area of the

tractor trailer, conducted immediately after defendant's arrest
for driving under the influence of a central nervous system
stimulant, justified as a search incident to arrest?
The standard of review articulated in State v. Pena, above,
also applies to these issues.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Following a traffic stop near Kanab in July of 1995,
defendant was charged with one count each of unlawful possession
of a controlled substance (over 100 pounds of marijuana), a
second degree felony; driving under the influence of drugs, a
class B misdemeanor; possession of more than one commercial
driver's license, a class C misdemeanor; falsifying a log book, a
class C misdemeanor; and driving with a defective stop light, a
class C misdemeanor (R. 18-20).
After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound defendant
over on all charges except falsifying a log book (R. 16-17).
Defendant filed a motion to suppress (R. 24-25, 28-29).
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the
motion, entering written findings of fact and conclusions of law
to support its ruling (R. 100-01, 103-08 or addendum A ) .
Defendant then entered a conditional plea agreement, in which he
pled guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance
(more than one pound of marijuana), a third degree felony, in
exchange for the State's dismissal of the remaining misdemeanor
charges (R. 115-19).

The court then entered a conviction on the

felony and eventually sentenced defendant to zero to five years
in the Utah State Prison (R. 121-22, 142-43).
timely notice of appeal (R. 124).

3

Defendant filed a

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Utah Highway Patrol trooper Stanley Fox, assigned to the
state safety inspection program, was patrolling eastbound out of
Kanab when defendant passed him driving a tractor trailer in the
opposite direction (R. 131: 8, 10, 11). Fox noticed that in
addition to the driver, a passenger was also seated in the front
seat (Id. at 11). Fox reversed directions "because [he] saw the
driver and a co-driver, both seated in the front seats, which
would require . . . the co-driver to have his log book current to
the last change of duty status" (Id. at

12). While following

the vehicle and looking for a suitable place to pull it over to
check the log book, Fox noticed that the left rear brake light on
the trailer was not functioning (Id. at 12, 77) .l

Both to check

the log book and to inform defendant of the equipment
malfunction, Trooper Fox activated his lights and stopped
defendant (Id. at 21, 78).
Trooper Fox approached defendant and asked to see his log
book and registration permits (Id. at 13). He also asked where
defendant was going, where he had been, and what he was hauling
(Id. at 13-14).

Describing defendant's response to this

encounter, Fox stated: "He - in answering the questions that I
asked him, while he was looking for his documents and so forth,

1

Trooper Fox noticed the brake light malfunction when
defendant applied the brakes going downhill in front of him (R.
131 at 20, 78).
4

he was quite broken in his answers.

They seemed to be, ah, not

really answers to the questions I was asking him or the things
that I was asking him for" (Id. at 13). Characterizing
defendant's behavior as "strange" and "spacey," Fox observed
"[t]he inability to carry on a good conversation, the cotton
mouth, dry lips, dry mouth, his very nervous condition, his foot
was - was virtually bouncin' off the floor while he was seated in
the vehicle.

It was - in fact, I remember it clattering against

the brake pedal and fuel feed.' . . ." (Id. at 17; 45). Fox also
noticed that defendant's left arm was "kind of unresponsive . . .
almost limp.

There seemed to be a physical defect there of some

type" (Id^ at 14).
After some searching, defendant produced the requested
documentation.

Trooper Fox then asked defendant to get out of

his vehicle so that he could point out the defective brake light
as well as a leaking axle seal he had later noticed (Id. at 15,
16, 79). The pair then walked back to the trooper's vehicle to
review the log book.
The log book stated that defendant was traveling from the
Flagstaff/Grey Mountain area.

According to Trooper Fox, however,

"[t]he period of time that had lapsed . . . was not consistent
with the amount of time it should have taken. . . . [T]here was
quite a bit more time there than what would have been reasonable"
(Id. at 17-18).

After some further discussion about the log

5

book, Fox suspected a "false fix" of the books (Id. at 71-73).2
Based on defendant's "very nervous condition" and his
"somewhat inconsistent answers on his whereabouts," Fox decided
to administer a drug recognition evaluation (Id. at 17). 3 Of the
eight field tests administered, defendant exhibited significant
difficulties on five of them (Id. at 20-35).

After questioning

defendant about the status of his health and his physical
condition, Trooper Fox concluded that defendant was under the
influence of a central nervous system stimulant.4

Accordingly,

he arrested defendant for driving under the influence (Id. at 3738) .

Fox also learned from defendant that the passenger, whom
defendant identified as Mike Hobbs, was not a co-driver (Id. at
43). Defendant stated that he had known Hobbs for six months,
and that he had picked him up in Tucson on the 16th of the month
(Id. at 44). Trooper Fox then approached the passenger, who was
still seated in the stopped vehicle. In response to Fox's
questions, the passenger identified himself as Carlos Gracia and
told Fox that he barely knew defendant, having only hitched a
ride with him the night before, which was the 17th of the month
(Id. at 45-46). It is unclear from the record, however, exactly
when in the sequence of events Fox received this conflicting
information.
3

Trooper Fox had previously noted the physical disability
associated with defendant's left arm. When he told defendant
that he would be undergoing field tests for drugs, defendant
complained that he couldn't do so because of his disability (Id.
at 28, 38). Fox took defendant's physical limitations into
consideration by focusing his assessment on the unaffected side
of defendant's body (IdL. at 34-37).
4

At the time of this incident, Trooper Fox had completed
the coursework to become a drug recognition evaluator, although
he had not yet been certified (Id. at 21) .
6

A few minutes later, Trooper Fox returned to the cab of the
tractor trailer.

Entering the cab, he opened the curtains

dividing the driving area from the sleeping area of the vehicle.
Fox testified that he "saw some large things underneath some
blankets and to make sure they weren't people, I uncovered them"
(Id. at 40). By so doing, he exposed "a large bundle . . . about
maybe two feet long and maybe a foot and a half in diameter . . .
the shape of a miniature hay bale.

It was wrapped in a plastic

contact paper, something similar to what you would line cupboards
with or drawers with in your home" (Id. at 41). Based on his
training, Fox assumed that the packaging contained marijuana
(Id.).

He tore back a corner of the bundle, exposing a green

leafy substance inside (Id. at 42).
Ultimately, thirty-three bales of marijuana, weighing just
over 350 pounds, were removed from the sleeper area of
defendant's tractor trailer (Id. at 49, 70).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant first argues that the Trooper Fox was not
justified in initially stopping his vehicle.

Fox, however, had

observed an equipment malfunction on defendant's tractor trailer
prior to effectuating the stop.

That personal observation

justified the stop.
Second, defendant argues that Fox impermissibly expanded the
scope of the stop by extending it beyond the time necessary to

7

cite defendant for the equipment violation.

However, when Fox

first approached defendant and engaged him in conversation, Fox
observed that defendant was unable to answer even simple
questions coherently, was so nervous that his foot noticeably
clattered against the brake pedal, and exhibited a significant
physical disability of one arm.

The trooper detained defendant

just long enough to determine, through a series of field tests,
whether defendant was driving under the influence of a central
nervous system stimulant.

Fox's reasonable suspicion that

defendant was impaired justified the limited expansion of the
scope of the stop.
Finally, defendant argues that, after he had been arrested,
Fox impermissibly searched the passenger compartment of the
tractor trailer.

This search, however, is most easily justified

as a search incident to arrest because the arrest was lawful, the
passenger compartment was within defendant's area of immediate
control, and because the search was contemporaneous with the
arrest.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE INITIAL STOP OF DEFENDANT'S
TRACTOR TRAILER WAS JUSTIFIED WHERE
A SAFETY INSPECTION OFFICER,
FOLLOWING DEFENDANT DOWN A HILL,
OBSERVED A MALFUNCTIONING BRAKE
LIGHT PRIOR TO EFFECTUATING THE
STOP
Defendant articulates the issue before the Court as follows:
"Having determined to stop the vehicle on fallacious grounds, is
an after observed mechanical defect justification for an officer
to stop a vehicle?" (Br. of App. at 7).
this question is "yes."

The simple answer to

That is, even if an officer intends to

stop a vehicle for a reason unsupported by the law5 and then,
prior to effectuating the stop, observes a violation that would
legally justify the stop, he is not precluded by his original
misjudgment from making the stop.

See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d

1127, 1140 (Utah 1994)(rejecting pretext doctrine and observing
that "*it is irrelevant what else the officer knew or suspected
about the traffic violator at the time of the stop.'" (citation
omitted)).
A traffic stop is justified at its inception if the stop is
"incident to a traffic violation committed in the officer's

The State does not concede that a log book violation
cannot justify a stop, but simply argues that the Court need not
reach the question where the officer personally observed a safety
equipment malfunction.
9

presence."

Id. at 1131 (quoting State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489,

491 (Utah App. 1990)).

Indeed, whenever a police officer

personally observes a traffic offense, no matter how minor, the
officer is justified in stopping the driver of the vehicle.
State v. Spuraeon, 904 P.2d 220, 224-25 (Utah App. 1995); Lopez,
873 P.2d at 1132.
In this case, regardless of whether Trooper Fox's desire to
check defendant's log book justified the stop, his observation of
a brake light malfunction would nonetheless independently suffice
to justify it.

See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-120(a) (articulating

requirement for brake lights); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880,
883 (Utah 1990) (vehicle stop justified where officer believed
vehicle safety equipment not functioning properly).

Fox

testified that, as he was following defendant's tractor trailer
down a hill, defendant applied the brakes, and the trooper
noticed that "there were no lights on the left side" (R. 130 at
21) .6 This observation alone would justify the stop, regardless
of any other bases that may have been available.

Cf. Spuraeon,

904 P.2d at 225 (two separate traffic violations each provided

6

Defendant argues that the brake light malfunction cannot
serve as a justification for stopping him because the officer
initially reversed directions and followed him with an improper
intent. Peace officers, however, can freely move about on the
roads without any justification, so long as their stops are based
either on observed traffic violations or on reasonable
articulable suspicion. State v. Spuraeon, 904 P.2d 220, 224 n.3
(Utah App. 1995)(citing Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (Utah 1994)).
XO

independent justification for stop).

Consequently, defendant's

argument that the initial stop of his vehicle was unjustified
must fail.
POINT TWO
THE SCOPE OF THE STOP WAS JUSTIFIED
WHERE THE OFFICER OBSERVED THAT THE
DRIVER OF THE TRACTOR TRAILER WAS
EXTREMELY NERVOUS, EXHIBITED A
SIGNIFICANT PHYSICAL DISABILITY,
AND WAS UNABLE TO COHERENTLY ANSWER
EVEN SIMPLE QUESTIONS
Defendant argues that after the officer showed him the
defective brake light, the stop should have been terminated.
That is, the officer would have been justified in citing him for
the defective brake light, but had no reason to extend the scope
of the stop beyond the time necessary to issue such a citation
(Br. of App. at 8, 12).
When an officer stops a vehicle, the resulting detention
"must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop."

Florida v. Royer, 4 60 U.S.

491, 500 (1983) . Any investigative questioning that detains the
driver beyond the original purposes of the stop "must be
supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal
activity" and "must be based on specific, articulable facts drawn
from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the
time of the stop."

Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (citations omitted).

Furthermore, even if the officer has such reasonable suspicion,

11

the officer must "diligently [pursue] a means of investigation
that [is] likely to confirm or dispel [the officer's] suspicions
quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to detain the
defendant."

State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah App.

1991)(citation omitted).
In this case, by the time Trooper Fox had shown defendant
the defective brake light, he had also noticed defendant's
"strange, spacey" behavior, his limp left arm, his bouncing foot,
and his inability to respond to simple, direct questions (R. 131
at 13-15, 45). Based on these specific facts, Fox reasonably
suspected either that defendant was operating his tractor trailer
under the influence of drugs or that he was impaired by a medical
condition.

Consequently, before permitting defendant to get back

on the highway behind the wheel of a tractor trailer, the officer
was justified in further investigating defendant's condition.
See generally Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers' Union, Inc., 118 F.3d
841, 848 (1st Cir. 1997)(discussing policy that "persons who are
under the influence of narcotics or other intoxicants should not
be permitted to operate commercial vehicles on public highways").
To confirm or dispel his suspicions of possible drug use,
Trooper Fox extended the detention long enough to administer a
drug recognition evaluation (R. 131 at 17). Indeed, a series of
field tests, under the facts here, presented the quickest way to
determine if the officer's suspicions were well-founded.

12

Based

on the results of the tests, and after ascertaining that
defendant was not in need of medical care or taking any
prescribed drugs, Trooper Fox concluded that defendant was
functioning under the influence of a central nervous system
stimulant (Id. at 80, 83-84).
The totality of the circumstances thus demonstrates that
Trooper Fox extended the detention beyond the scope of the
original stop in order to determine in the most expeditious way
possible whether or not defendant was operating a vehicle under
the influence of drugs.

Defendant's argument that the scope of

the detention was unjustified, therefore, must fail.
POINT THREE
TROOPER FOX'S SEARCH OF THE SLEEPER
COMPARTMENT WAS JUSTIFIED AS A
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
Defendant contends that even if Trooper Fox reasonably
believed that defendant was under the influence of a CNS
stimulant, that belief alone, absent exigent circumstances,
cannot justify the officer's search for drugs in the tractor
trailer's sleeper compartment (Br. of App. at 14-15).

Further,

he argues, the search cannot be sustained as an impound inventory
search.

Consequently, he argues, the evidence found in the

sleeper should be suppressed.
The law is well-settled that a reviewing court "can affirm
the trial court on any proper legal ground," even if that ground

13

was not argued before the lower court.

State v. Hansen, 837 P.2d

987, 988 (Utah App. 1992)(citation omitted).

In this case, the

officer's search of the sleeper compartment may be justified as a
search incident to arrest.7
An arresting officer may conduct a warrantless search
incident to arrest of both an arrestee and the area within the
arrestee's immediate control if: 1) the arrest is lawful; 2) the
search is confined to the area over which the arrestee has
immediate control; and 3) the search is conducted
contemporaneously with the arrest,
454, 460 (1981);
(1969).

New York v. Belton, 4 53 U.S.

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763-64

The purpose of such a search is limited to preventing

the arrestee from gaining control over a weapon or from
destroying evidence of a crime.

Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763; accord

7

In its written findings of fact and conclusions of law
supporting its denial of defendant's suppression motion, the
trial court concluded that "it was reasonable for Trooper Fox to
return to the tractor to perform an inventory search of the
tractor" (R. 104 or addendum A). The record reflects that:
impounding the vehicle was proper because the passenger was not
certified to drive a tractor trailer; the Highway Patrol has
written policies and procedures for conducting impound
inventories; and Trooper Fox was engaged in an inventory when he
looked in the cab (R. 40, 43, 90). This limited record evidence
provides thin support for the trial court's determination. See
State v. Stricklinq, 844 P.2d 979, 988-90 (Utah App. 1992)
(discussing need for evidence to support finding that officer
acted in compliance with established departmental policies for
conducting impound inventory searches and affirming in case where
such evidence was "admittedly thin"). Consequently, the State
offers a stronger alternative ground upon which to affirm, should
the Court find the record too bare to support an impound
inventory search.
14

State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 180 (Utah 1983).
In this case, all three elements of a search incident to
arrest have been fulfilled.

First, as has been explained in

Points I and II, the arrest was lawful.

The brake light

malfunction justified the initial stop of defendant's tractortrailer.

Once defendant had been stopped and the officer

observed his peculiar behavior, the officer expanded the scope of
the stop just enough to determine, through easily-administered
field tests, that defendant was under the influence of a central
nervous system stimulant or had an unknown medical condition.
After defendant himself eliminated a medical explanation for his
behavior, the officer lawfully arrested him for driving under the
influence of a CNS stimulant.
Second, the search was limited to an area over which
defendant had immediate control, as both federal and state
appellate courts have interpreted that phrase.

The United States

Supreme Court has construed "immediate control" to mean "the area
from within which [a suspect] might gain possession of a weapon
or destructible evidence."

Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.

Establishing a bright line test, the Court subsequently ruled
that when a vehicle stop is involved, the area of immediate
control includes the passenger compartment.
453 U.S. at 4 60.

New York v. Belton,

Further, the area of immediate control "can

extend to a closed container left in the passenger area of a car,

15

even after the arrestee has been moved away from the car."

State

v, Harrison. 805 P.2d 769, 784 (Utah App. 1991)(citing Belton,
453 U.S. at 461), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).

In

essence, every person arrested is viewed "as a combination
acrobat and Houdini who might well free himself from his
restraints and suddenly gain access to some distant place." 2
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 6.3(c), at 628 (1987).
In this case, the passenger compartment of the tractor
trailer contained two areas, one for driving and one for
sleeping, separated only by a curtain (R. 40). Because both
areas were contiguous to each other and equally accessible,
defendant or his passenger could as easily have destroyed
evidence or secured a weapon from one area as the other.
Consequently, in order to effectuate the purpose of a search
incident to arrest, the officer's right to search the passenger
compartment must encompass the right to search both the driving
area and the sleeping area.8

See State v. Johnson, 892 P.2d 106,

108-09 (Wash. App. 1995) (passenger compartment of tractor
trailer includes sleeping area of cab reachable without exiting

8

When the officer "saw some large things underneath some
blankets," he uncovered them in order to make sure the "things"
were not people (R. 131:40). Plainly, he did so for his own
safety. When he found bales wrapped in contact paper, he knew
from his training and experience that they likely contained
marijuana (Id. at 41-42, 92-93). These actions plainly fell
within the ambit of a search incident to arrest. See, e.g.,
Belton, 453 U.S. at 461.
16

the cab); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.1(c), at 45051 (3rd ed. 1996) (passenger compartment should be construed as
including all space that can be reached without exiting the
vehicle).
Finally, the evidence is undisputed that the search of the
vehicle occurred minutes after defendant had been arrested and,
indeed, before the passenger was arrested (R. 39, 42). 9
The facts in this case thus demonstrably fulfill all the
requirements of a search incident to arrest.

Consequently, this

Court can sustain the search on that basis.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this j ^

day of August, 1999.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General

9

The passenger, then, was not constrained from accessing
the passenger compartment and whatever it might contain.
17
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ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM A

COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696]
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
ERIC D. PETERSEN [7424]
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
76 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (435) 644-5278
Facsimile: (435) 644-2281

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.

)
)
)
)
)

WILLIAM JOSEPH CHEVRE,
Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 951600068
JUDGE K. L. McIFF

This matter came before the Court on October 27, 1995,
pursuant to Defendant's Motion To Suppress.

The State of Utah

was represented by Colin R. Winchester, Kane County Attorney.
The Defendant was present and was represented by counsel, Jim R.
Scarth.

The parties presented evidence and argued their

respective positions.

Counsel then requested that they be

allowed to submit written memoranda in support of their
respective positions.

On November 22, 1996, the matter came

before the Court for additional argument and the issuance of the
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Court's decision.

The Court, having heard the testimony, having

reviewed the parties1 memoranda, and having heard the arguments
of counsel, now therefore enters the following:
FINDINGS OP PACT
1."

On July 18, 1995, Utah Highway Patrolman Stanley B. Fox

pulled over a westbound tractor trailer on U.S. Highway 8 9 in
Kanab, Utah.
2.

The tractor was being driven by the Defendant, and the

only other occupant was an adult male in the passenger seat.
3.

Trooper Fox was accompanied by State Safety Inspector

David Shiers.
4.

Trooper Fox decided to pull over the tractor trailer to

check the driver's log book.
5.

As Trooper Fox was preparing to find a place to pull

over the tractor trailer, he noticed an inoperable brake light on
the trailer.
6.

Trooper Fox made the stop primarily to check the

driver's log book and conduct a mechanical inspection.
7.

Once Trooper Fox made the stop, he talked to the

Defendant, and noticed that the Defendant was "prettyff nervous,
that his left arm seemed "kinda" unresponsive, and that the
Defendant seemed to have a physical defect of some type.
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Trooper

Fox noticed that the Defendant's foot "was virtually bouncin' off
the floor.11
8.

Trooper Fox began to ask the Defendant questions

relating to his log book and permits.
9.

Trooper Fox observed the Defendant's extreme nervous

condition, his inability to carry on a decent conversation, his
cotton mouth or dry mouth, and his continual licking of his lips.
10.

Trooper Fox asked the Defendant to get out of the

tractor to show him the inoperable brake light, and a leaking oil
seal, and to review the log book and have more discussion.
11.

Once Trooper Fox had the Defendant in his patrol

vehicle, he asked the Defendant to perform some drug recognition
tests for the following reasons: inability to carry on a
conversation, cotton mouth, dry lips, very nervous condition, and
somewhat inconsistent answers regarding his whereabouts.
12.

The Defendant complied, and performed some of the drug

recognition tests.
13.

At the time, although Trooper Fox had completed a drug

recognition course, he did not hold a drug recognition
evaluator!s certificate because copies of the evaluations he had
performed as part of his training had not been sent in to the
instructors, and because he had not yet sent in a resume.
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14.

Based on his training and the drug recognition

evaluation, Trooper Fox determined that the Defendant was under
the influence of a central nervous system stimulant.
15.

Trooper Fox then placed the Defendant under arrest for

driving under the influence of drugs.
16.

After placing the Defendant under arrest, Trooper Fox

opened and looked into the trailer.
17.

The passenger did not have a commercial driver's

license.
18.

Trooper Fox then returned to the tractor to search for

a central nervous stimulant and to conduct an inventory search,
because the truck was going to be impounded.
19.

Upon returning to the tractor, Trooper Fox opened the

curtain to the sleeper area, saw something large under some
blankets, and removed the blankets, all to ensure that no one was
in the sleeper area.
20.

Instead of finding a person, Trooper Fox found several

large bundles wrapped in contact paper.
21.

Trooper Fox tore open the corner of one bundle, having

assumed the contents to be marijuana, based on training he had
received.
22.

Ultimately, the bundles were weighed, and found to

contain 159.04 kilograms (350.6 pounds) of marijuana.
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CONCLUSIONS OP LAW
1.

The initial stop of the tractor trailer was legitimate

because of the defective brake light on the trailer.

Trooper

Fox's decision to stop the tractor trailer to examine the
driver's log book, which was made prior to the discovery of the
defective brake light, does not adversely affect the legitimacy
of the stop.
2.

Based on Defendant's noted physical characteristics

while Trooper Fox was at the tractor door, i.e., Defendant's
nervous condition, his "kinda" unresponsive arm, his bouncing
foot, his inability to carry on a conversation, his cotton mouth
or dry mouth, the continual licking of his lips, and his
inconsistent answers about his whereabouts, Trooper Fox was
justified in asking Defendant out of the tractor, and was
justified in having Defendant perform the drug recognition tests.
3.

After Defendant was arrested for driving under the

influence of a central nervous stimulant, it was reasonable for
Trooper Fox to return to the tractor to perform an inventory
search of the tractor.
4.

It was reasonable for Trooper Fox to open the curtain

to the tractor's sleeper area, and to remove the blankets to
ensure that no one was under them.
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5.

Based on Trooper Fox's training, it was reasonable for

him to tear the corner of one of the bundles to examine the
contents.

DATED this Mttt day of November, 1997-.

BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 30th day of May, 1997, I served a true
and correct unsigned copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to each person or entity listed below:
Jim R. Scarth
P. O. Box 160
St. George, UT 84771

(via hand delivery)

^yTlaA^u P J&**('
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the /^ day of 18&T&$&&C, 1997, I served a
true and correct signed copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to each person or entity listed below:
Jim R. Scarth
P. O. Box 160
St. George, UT 84771

(via first class mail)
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